CANNON FODDER

Even the best of the best can fail if overconfidence clouds their judgement. Before I talk about the recent ambush by Maoists, I will show you a brief video analysis of the ambush of US Green Berets considered as one of the finest among the military forces in Tongo Tongo by underequipped but numerically superior Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). But bear in mind that in the case of CRPF the numerical superiority lay with them and not the enemy.

After watching this video, the conclusion I came upon are -

1. a disorganised and confused force can not effectively retaliate and break through an ambush

2. if you loose fire superiority you are as good as dead

3. situational awareness is of extreme importance

4. an enemy though lacking in sophistication but extremely motivated will give a very tough fight

5. the role of close air support is paramount for survival when faced with overwhelming odds.

Now coming to the ambush of CRPF and police forces in Chhattisgarh in April of 2021, the deaths on the side of police forces are not due to inadequate training as far as I understand from the news reports but due to severe under preparedness from the higher officers and and the police command.

This ambush had all the tell tale signs of one, it was unusually quiet and villagers were tense and yet this raised no red flags. Due to the sheer intensity and effectiveness of the ambush the Maoists managed to dislodge a superior force from higher ground (which is extremely hard to do, an example would be Kargil war). So it begs the question why such a big gap in intelligence occurred and why no reinforcements were sent. It took a full day even for the CRPF to get a clear picture of what transpired.

I will break up my analysis into a few points to give you a better understanding -

a) The Maoists were reportedly around 300 to 400 which is a pretty large grouping and thus not easy to hide from surveillance technology. My question is "why were no drone coverage given to the police search parties ?" If they were provided with such a support these drones would have easily picked up the thermal signature of such a large enemy force easily. Also keep in mind that Ministry oh Home has procured multiple drone systems capable of such surveillance to aid CRPF in combatting Maoists, so why were not they put to use ? The lack of surveillance cost the police forces situational awareness.

Refer bulletin number 3.

b) It was reported that the Maoists used LMGs (Light Machine Guns) and rockets, so they were clearly prepared, but why were the police forces not provided with such weapon systems especially when operating in high risk environment which calls for para-military operations. Additionally no MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles were provided whose name itself suggests that it could survive an ambush. Even if it was a foot patrol such vehicles could have been kept as standby or as a QRF (Quick Reaction Force) to bail out the main forces if they got in trouble, yet no such thing was done. A QRF would have responded with more coordination than a force caught right in the middle of an ambush and certainly could have helped regain the fire superiority.

Refer bulletin number 1 and 2

c) The numerical superiority of the police forces gave them a false sense of safety as they thought the strength in numbers would dissuade any enemy attack on them. Though there were in greater numbers I strongly believe they lacked coordination because if there was coordination among various police forces involved they could have broken through the ambush. Also it is inherently very difficult to coordinate such large forces especially if they are caught off guard. The Maoists capitalised on this and their gamble paid off in spades.

Refer bulletin number 4

d) It is reported that the police forces tried to prepare a landing site for helicopters for medical evacuation (Usually helicopters do not try to land in an active conflict zone as not to risk loosing one to enemy fire especially if the presence of LMGs and rockets are confirmed) but what perplexes me is that why that helicopters did not provide over-watch or close air support to the troops on the ground by strafing enemy positions with guns (they are forbidden from using explosive munitions like rockets and missiles because that would make the government look bad on Television but the Maoists have no such moral hang-ups when they are slaughtering our police forces) . The reason is that the rules of engagement state that the helicopters can only return fire if they are fired upon, this type of handicap imposed on the police forces is truly horrific since they are fighting with one hand tied. At the least the helicopters could have scouted enemy positions (if they were unarmed versions) and reported it back to the forces on the ground thereby increasing their chances of survival, but nothing of that sorts was done. On the other hand Maoists have no such limitations making them more deadly.

Refer bulletin number 5

I really am bewildered at the gross incompetence from the officers who doesn't risk anything and oversee operations from the safety of their air conditioned rooms inside heavily fortified bases. I also don't understand why IPS cadre officers with shit for brains are given the responsibility of conducting para-military operations. Maybe it is time these officers are made to watch some modern war documentaries and movies so that they can get their act together and conduct operations that are not abject failures since so called commando training has obviously failed to induce results.

To put it simply our soldiers became cannon fodder all thanks to their superiors.